Description:

This page intentionally left blank An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, and this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to the subject. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, the problem of the criterion, a priori knowledge, and naturalized epistemology. Intended primarily for students taking a first class in epistemology, this lucid and well-written text would also provide an excellent introduction for anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy. Noah Lemos is Professor at the College of William and Mary. He is author of Intrinsic Value (1994) and Common Sense (2004). An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge NOAH LEMOS The College of William and Mary CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org 978-0-521-84213-6 © Noah Lemos 2007 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2007 ISBN-13 978-0-511-27118-2 eBook (Adobe Reader) ISBN-10 0-511-27118-2 eBook (Adobe Reader) ISBN-13 978-0-521-84213-6 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-84213-1 hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-60309-6 paperback ISBN-10 0-521-60309-9 paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. For my sons, Christopher and Adam Contents Preface 1 Knowledge, truth, and justification 2 The traditional analysis and the Gettier problem 3 Foundationalism 4 The coherence theory of justification 5 Reliabilism and virtue epistemology 6 Internalism, externalism, and epistemic circularity 7 Skepticism 8 The problem of the criterion 9 The a priori 10 Naturalized epistemology Select bibliography Index Preface The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is one of the main areas of philosophy. Some of the problems are as old as Plato, yet they remain alive and interesting today. This book is intended to introduce the reader to some of the main problems in epistemology and to some proposed solutions. It is primarily intended for students taking their first course in the theory of knowledge, but it should also be useful to the generally educated reader interested in learning something about epistemology. I do not assume that the reader has an extensive background in philosophy. In writing an introductory text, one must balance many things. I have sought to strike a balance between impartial presentation and advocacy. In general, I have tried to be fair and neutral between competing positions, yet in some places I defend some views. I have also sought to hit the mean between breadth and depth of coverage. I have not tried to cover every important or recent position or to cover every development within the views I discuss. I have tried to focus with clarity on some main features of a few major positions. I hope this approach will be helpful to the reader seeking an introduction to epistemology. I have tried to hit the mean, but as Aristotle says, the mean rests with perception. I apologize for my blindspots. In chapter 1, I distinguish between some senses of ‘‘knows’’ and note that our primary focus will be on propositional knowledge. I introduce the traditional view that propositional knowledge is justified true belief and discuss in a general way the concepts of belief, truth, and justification. In chapter 2, we consider some problems for this traditional view, problems made prominent in a brief essay by Edmund Gettier. Much of chapter 2 is devoted to considering some simple ways of analyzing or defining knowledge that avoid the problems to which Gettier calls our attention. Unfortunately, none of these are successful, but they represent some basic attempts upon which others have tried to improve. In chapters 3, 4, and 5, we explore some views about what makes beliefs justified. In these chapters we will look at versions of foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. I have tried not to discuss every version or nuance of these views. Most likely, too much detail would overwhelm the reader and prevent one from understanding the main points of the theory. In chapter 6, I discuss briefly the debate between internalism and externalism about justification before turning to the problem of epistemic circularity. The problem of epistemic circularity arises when we consider how we can know that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. Can one use a way of forming beliefs to support the belief that that way of forming beliefs is reliable? Can one use memory, for example, to support the belief that memory is a reliable way of forming beliefs? Chapter 7 addresses the problem of skepticism. We consider several skeptical arguments and consider some main responses to them. These include the Moorean response, the relevant alternatives response, the contextualist response, and the inference to the best explanation response. In chapter 8, we turn to the problem of the criterion. We focus on Roderick Chisholm’s formulation of the problem and his favored position, ‘‘particularism.’’ Throughout much of this book we will appeal to particular examples of knowledge and justification in assessing criteria of knowledge and justification. Is this an epistemically unsatisfactory procedure? In chapter 9, we will explore some views about a priori knowledge and justification and consider whether our a priori knowledge and justification is confined to what is ‘‘analytic.’’ Chapter 10 concludes with a brief discussion of some central themes in naturalistic epistemology. Again, I have tried to balance breadth with depth and always with an eye to providing a clear and useful introduction to epistemology. I would recommend that anyone seriously interested in studying the subject read this book in conjunction with a good anthology of contemporary essays in the field. In that way the reader will be exposed to more sophisticated and detailed versions of the views considered here. I wish to thank Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press for her support and patience. I wish to thank several people who read and commented on parts of the manuscript: Erik Wielenberg, Girrard Brenneman, Luke M. Davis, and most especially James Beebe. I wish to thank my wife, Lisa, for her patience and for putting so much on hold while I completed this project. I also thank her for my sons, Christopher and Adam, to whom this book is dedicated. 1 Knowledge, truth, and justification Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is concerned with a variety of questions about knowledge and related topics. Certainly one of the most important questions is ‘‘What is the extent of our knowledge?’’ Some philosophers, especially those in the ‘‘common sense’’ tradition, would say that we know pretty much those things that we ordinarily think we know. They would tell us, for example, that we know that there are other people, that they think and feel, that we were alive yesterday, that there are cars and dogs, and so on. They would tell us that we know a lot about our immediate physical surroundings, other people, and the past. Others would add that we know various ethical and moral truths and some would also say that they know various truths about God and God’s attitude toward mankind. Still other philosophers, influenced by various forms of skepticism, would say that we know much less than any of this, and the most extreme skeptics would say that we really know nothing at all. Evaluating these views is no easy matter, and when we reflect on them, and the reasons advanced in favor of them, we are soon led to other questions about knowledge. Such reflection might naturally lead us to ask one of the most important and oldest epistemological questions, ‘‘What is knowledge?’’ Over two millennia ago, Plato wrestled with it in his dialogue, Theaetetus. Plato sought a definition of knowledge, but came to no clear answer and the dialogue ended inconclusively. The primary aim of this chapter is to introduce the traditional account of propositional knowledge as epistemically justified true belief. In the first section, propositional knowledge will be distinguished from other sorts of knowledge. In the second section, the traditional account of knowledge will be introduced. Next, I shall make some general remarks about the main components of the traditional account, about belief, truth, and epistemic justification. Finally, I will make some general comments about justification and evidence, and introduce the concept of evidential defeat. Three senses of ‘‘knows’’ In ordinary language when we say that someone knows something, we can mean different things by ‘‘knows.’’ There are different senses of ‘‘knowledge’’ or, we may say, different kinds of knowledge. Among the three most significant are (1) propositional knowledge, (2) acquaintance knowledge, and (3) ‘‘how to’’ knowledge. Let us begin with propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts or true propositions. So, consider the following examples of propositional knowledge: (1) John knows that Caesar was assassinated. (2) Mary knows that she has a headache. (3) Sam knows that it will rain tomorrow. Ключевые слова: oxford, skeptical scenario, basic, burned timber, answer, principle, external, good, justified basic, proposition, ordinary member, press, vice versa, slipped, judge correctly, causally connected, source, ipso facto, ernest sosa, justified believing, true belief, instance, true, smiths ground, moore, intellectual seemings, justification, epistemic responsibility, presidents whereabouts, roxannes procedure, perceptual, bertrand russell, pair, traditional account, fall short, wa, hot lump, philosophical, epistemic circularity, office, university, ha, matthias steup, hand, reliable, false, arms length, epistemology, problem, priori, contemporary sources, account, wadsworth publishing, knowledge, view, approach, suppose, theory knowledge, believing, general, ibid, oxford handbook, no, truth, process, subjunctive conditionals, hold, reasonable, criterion, edmund gettier, perception, strong account, form, born, epistemic evaluation, arrogant assertion, central theme, philosopher, crystal ball, clairvoyant power, cambridge, epistemic appraisal, richard mckeon, belief justified, reason, claim, pojman belmont, social science, iii, hit, kind, smiths fingerprint, foundationalism, defeasibility account, sosa, virtue, properly reconstructed, introduction theory knowledge, holistic conception, philosophical scepticism, adam, red, propositional attitude, brain tumor, coherence, people, priori justification, phenomenologically indistinguishable, mistaken, campus directory, browns address, common, vast majority, yes, simple logical, practically rational, colored, cognitive possession, contemporary readings, evidence, experience, plausible, property, philosophical works, firmly established, evil demon, minnesota press, doe, epistemically circular, reliability, weakly justified, implies, smith, basic belief, prima facie, jtb account, common sense, requires, simply, sort, aptness, richard feldman, justificational defeater, empirical, maximizing, sheer coincidence, sense, perceptual belief, jones, premise, causal chain, justified, chapter, decapitated, augustine, skeptic, simple, gettier, belief, skepticism, support, handle brain, talk intelligently, argument, response, john, introduction, pythagorean theorem, proper reconstruction, judge rightly, clear, basis, ii, justificational chain, introduction theory, epistemic, exclusion, case, goldman, properly reconstructs, reliabilism, tom, epistemically, chisholm, morally obligatory, linear conception, justified belief, concept, subjunctive conditional, minneapolis, russells paradox, broad daylight, introspective awareness, question, factual defeater, replacement thesis, favorable evaluation, intellectual, standard, university press, theory, knowing, epistemic status, roxanne, relevant, memory, objection, fact, explanation, rationally conclusive, intellectual powers, skeptical, respect, object, comparing, alternative